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Gabriel Collins, Andrew Erickson, Lyle Goldstein, and William Murray
he U.S. Navy submarine force has set the standard in undersea warfare for at 
least half a century. America’s submarines made a vital contribution to vic­
tory in the Second World War, and they formed an elite force of truly innovative 
capabilities during the “Cold War at sea” with the Soviet Navy. Since the end of 
the Cold War, the submarine force has been a leader among U.S. military war­
fighting communities in transforming itself to remain relevant against militant 
Islamist extremism and other emerging threats.
In such missions, the submarine force conducts strategic deterrence, intel­
ligence and surveillance, extended­range land attack, and insertion of special 
forces, in addition to forming the essential backbone of the Navy’s mission of 
sea control—the all­important, enabling task of maintaining command of the 
seas for the U.S. armed forces. With the launch of the first of the Virginia class in 
2003, the Navy’s position at the forefront of global submarine forces was set for 
the foreseeable future.
Perhaps partly inspired by the great successes of the U.S. submarine force, na­
vies around the world have invested heavily in undersea warfare, especially in 
submarine capabilities. China stands out among these 
as an emerging submarine power. Over the last decade, 
Beijing has been building four different classes of boats 
while importing the Kilo­class diesel submarine from 
Russia in large numbers. Indeed, China’s intense focus 
on undersea warfare has led some to speculate that a 
transpacific rivalry is already under way, at least with 
respect to submarine capabilities. As policy makers in 
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Washington grapple with the challenge of China’s rise, therefore, it may be wise 
to consider how Beijing is approaching its evolving naval strategy dilemmas. This 
article examines Chinese views of the American submarine force. As that sub­
marine force constitutes one of the most vital elements of Washington’s overall 
strategy for establishing and maintaining sea control in times of conflict, Beijing’s 
assessment of those capabilities may be critical to uncovering the future evolu­
tion of this nascent rivalry.
More specifically, then, this research was undertaken for three reasons:
The U.S. Navy submarine force is thought to represent a key capability 
for conflict scenarios involving China.
This part of the U.S. Navy has undertaken major efforts at transformation 
within a new geostrategic and technological environment.
The American submarine force represents a rather well­defined warfare 
area and thus lends itself to a bounded research effort.
Over the last decade, there has been an explosion of publishing in China on all 
subjects, including strategic and military­technical research. Thus, there are at 
least five serious journals devoted to naval warfare and dozens of more techni­
cally oriented journals.1 In this project, well over a thousand Chinese articles were 
surveyed, of which approximately 150 were judged worthy of closer scrutiny and 
analysis by the research team. The danger of circularity—attributing to Chinese 
analysts ideas that have simply been translated from original English­language 
sources into Chinese—is real, but one that the research team carefully considered 
throughout. Most Chinese journals now openly attribute English­language arti­
cles to their original sources. By and large, this kind of material (direct translation 
from English) was not evaluated in this study, in favor of articles that appeared to 
represent the actual opinions of Chinese naval and defense analysts.
This article is divided into five parts. The first section surveys Chinese reac­
tions to a variety of current issues in the U.S. submarine force, including recent 
deployments and incidents of special interest. A second section examines Chinese 
evaluations of specific submarine force capabilities, focusing especially on new 
factors (e.g., the development of SSGNs) that have been central to transforma­
tion efforts. Section three considers some critical historical issues, particularly 
Chinese perceptions of U.S. submarine operations during the Cold War. A fourth 
section considers how Chinese analysts believe their antisubmarine forces would 
match up against the U.S. submarine force. Section five reviews Chinese percep­
tions regarding the overall future trajectory of the U.S. submarine force. A con­
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Overall, this article finds that Chinese naval analysts study the U.S. submarine 
force in excruciating detail, as concretely manifested in thousands of both stra­
tegic and technical articles that focus on it.2 As one Chinese naval analyst puts it, 
“Nuclear attack subs are the most worthwhile weapons investments because they 
are the most survivable weapons platforms. . . . During a regional conflict, [U.S.] 
nuclear attack submarines are the first in and last out.”3 Nevertheless, there is also 
a keen appreciation that the U.S. Navy is focusing primarily on ongoing military 
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Writing in the official PLA journal 当代海军 
(Modern Navy), one analysis declares, “The U.S. Navy’s capabilities to wage war at 
sea are gradually declining, and open ocean warfare is already not a focal point.”4 
Recognizing the potentially major role of the U.S. submarine force in China con­
tingencies, another analyst suggests: “On the basis of a great quantity of research, 
the PLA [People’s Liberation Army] believes that U.S. nuclear submarines are 
very quiet, and difficult to discover and counterattack; at the same time, [their] 
attack power is great, [and] must [be] restrain[ed].”5 Such assessments underline 
the importance of a closer examination of Chinese perspectives concerning the 
American submarine force.
Current Developments
In order to give a sense of what Chinese analysts believe to be the trajectory of 
U.S. submarine force development, it is useful to examine their assessments of 
two significant recent events: the grounding of the Los Angeles–class submarine 
USS San Francisco (SSN 711) and the stationing of nuclear­powered submarines 
on Guam.
The Grounding of the USS san Francisco 
The collision of San Francisco with an underwater mountain on 8 January 2005 
greatly interested China’s naval press. The articles published then, which promi­
nently feature official U.S. photos of the damaged vessel, express admiration that 
a submarine that received such damage could have returned to port. This respect 
is couched in terms of the fundamental strength designed and built into the ship, 
however, not in terms of the critical factors of crew training and damage con­
trol. Author Qi Yaojiu, for example, wrote approximately four months after the 
incident in a typical article, “In order to investigate battle damage strength, the 
U.S. undertook strength tests [for submarines] under the conditions of nuclear 
weapons detonation.” Additionally, “almost every U.S. submarine, before enter­
ing into active service, undergoes tests that use underwater explosives to evaluate 
resistance to battle damage.”6
Notwithstanding this apparent respect, the author recognized that the damage 
San Francisco incurred would have amounted to a “mission kill,” stating: “If the 
3
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San Francisco collision had occurred during wartime, and crew members had ex­
perienced such wounds, the San Francisco would essentially lose its basic combat 
effectiveness.”7 A realization that submarines do not have to be destroyed in order 
to lose combat effectiveness could influence Chinese operational calculations.
Also characteristic of Chinese discussions of San Francisco’s grounding is an 
undercurrent of bewilderment, asking in effect, “Why were they going so fast?” 
The tone of analysis implies that such a high­speed transit is somewhat reckless. 
Thus, one Chinese analyst states that “a nuclear submarine in the process of under­
water high speed transit is confronting serious danger” and that “even some U.S. 
Navy officials expressed that they could not understand the incident.”8 Another 
author declares, “It is well known in all navies that as soon as a submarine enters 
international waters in order to protect its stealth, the submarine will not rely 
on its active sonar. Objectively speaking, a submarine at high speed that is not 
operating its active sonar is in danger comparable to a vehicle without headlights 
traveling in the pitch dark.”9 Perhaps because China’s submarine force consists 
primarily of diesel submarines that rarely make high­speed, long­distance tran­
sits, the circumstances surrounding the collision seem peculiar to Chinese naval 
analysts.
Chinese analyses of the San Francisco incident recognize the United States as 
a world leader in submarine rescue.10 As one author observes, “Overall, the USN 
employs the best submarine rescue vehicles and has the most extensive exercises, 
so its submarine rescue capability leads the world.”11 This appraisal is corrobo­
rated in Modern Navy: “Over the last few years, the U.S. Navy has continuously 
explored submarine rescue methods, and thus strengthened international co­
operation, enhancing submarine rescue exercises with its allies. For us this repre­
sents a certain inspiration.” Moreover, the Chinese author states, “small groups at 
various bases are alternatively ready for war or ready to go out and undertake the 
rescue of an American or allied submarine at any time.”12 Even though the Chi­
nese navy evidently has extreme respect for the U.S. submarine force, the analyses 
of the San Francisco incident appear to show awareness that even this elite force 
can make errors and must invest in cutting­edge rescue technologies.
SSNs in Apra Harbor
As might be expected, China’s naval press has watched the military buildup on 
Guam with great interest, particularly that of the American submarines.13 A 2004 
article in Modern Navy suggests, “The U.S. Navy has stationed three nuclear­ 
powered Los Angeles–class attack submarines on Guam. At present, the U.S. mili­
tary has considered dispatching an additional 6 nuclear submarines. . . . Deploy­
ment of such weapons would give the U.S. military considerable capacity to ‘gain 
the initiative by striking first’ at us from the sea.”14
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The same journal a year later described the basing of nuclear­powered attack 
submarines (SSNs) on Guam in greater detail, observing that the United States of­
ficially reestablished Submarine Squadron 15 on Guam under Submarine Group 
7 in February 2001 and deployed three nuclear­powered attack submarines there: 
the first and second in fall 2002 and the third in summer 2004. Moreover, as ad­
ministered by Commander, Submarine Force Pacific, the submarine group “on 
the basis of troop deployment plans regularly dispatches 4–5 submarines un­
der its 7th fleet jurisdiction. The duty period of these submarines is ordinarily 6 
months. Each submarine can execute missions independently, or can attach to a 
carrier battle group.”15
The operational significance of stationing SSNs on Guam is not lost on Chi­
nese naval analysts. One observes that “if [a submarine] sets out from Guam, 
especially in a Taiwan Strait crisis, it may only require 2 days or so.”16 A significant 
finding of the present study is that even in official journals, Chinese analysts are 
exploring Guam’s vulnerabilities. The same author notes that Guam, in addition 
to conferring some advantages to the United States in a Taiwan crisis, also carries 
self­defense vulnerabilities having strategic implications:
The U.S. military has still not established a defense system of anti­aircraft, anti­
missile, and other defense systems on Guam—[there exists] only a pittance of 
coastal patrol forces. Once there are hostilities, Guam’s defense can only rely on 
the U.S. Navy’s sea­based missile defense system and Air Force joint operations. 
Consequently, in wartime, Guam’s defense is still a problem; also, because it is in 
a special position surrounded on four sides by ocean at the intersection of three 
major international sea lanes, it is impossible to defend effectively. If the other 
side’s long­range ballistic missiles, submarine­launched cruise missiles, long­range 
bombers or maritime special forces operations units, etc., can break through 
Guam’s peripheral warning and defense, [to] destroy or seriously damage its naval 
port, airfield, munitions warehouse, and communications system, [then] the 
entire operational system of America in the Pacific Theater can become ineffec­
tive, its sustained warfare capability can greatly fall short of requirements [and] its 
resolution and dynamics of military intervention would have to change.17
Regardless of the validity of their specific claims, then, it is clear that some Chi­
nese analysts perceive Guam to be vulnerable to offensive attacks.
u.s. navy Capabilities
Having set the scene by reviewing major submarine force developments noted 
by Chinese analysts, we now turn to a more comprehensive survey of the ma­
jor American capabilities that have attracted their attention. These include nuclear­
 powered cruise missile–armed submarines (SSGNs) and Tomahawk cruise 
	 72	 naval	war	college	review
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missiles, Trident submarines, fast attack submarines, sensors and systems, and 
research and development.
SSGNs and Tomahawks
Chinese analyses demonstrate interest in the Navy’s four new SSGNs, their con­
version from Ohio­class ballistic­missile submarines, and their mission areas.18 A 
fairly typical article observes that
refitting focal points are refitting the first 1–2 of 24 ballistic missile launch tubes 
for the use of special forces; tubes 3–10 into special forces use or for Tomahawk 
cruise missiles; [and] tubes 11–24 for Tomahawk cruise missiles. After refitting, 
the submarine can carry 154 Tomahawk cruise missiles, and 66 special forces per­
sonnel, a dock/shipyard cover, a frogman transport ship (SDV), and an advanced 
Seal Transport System (ASDS).19
Although they clearly recognize the potential value of an SSGN’s embarked 
special operations forces, Chinese analysts appear to be much more impressed by 
the implications of one SSGN’s potentially large inventory of Tomahawk cruise 
missiles and the high readiness rate that SSGNs will be able to maintain. One 
perceptive article observes that these features will allow other ships to focus on 
different mission areas:
After being refitted, SSGNs will be deployed 65% of the time each year on average. . . .  
As such, the USN will always have at least 2 SSGNs ready for battle at any time, 
and in wartime, 1 SSGN can take over the duties of many attack submarines and 
surface ships. Once the SSGN goes into service, this will significantly reduce the 
land attack burden shouldered by the surface fleet and allow it to focus on provid­
ing air defense against missile threats. At the same time, the SSGN will reduce the 
land attack role of SSNs, enabling them to concentrate on anti­surface and ASW 
[antisubmarine warfare] missions.
The same analysis also recognizes with some alarm that “it is conceivable that in 
the future the arsenal ships could from a safe distance simultaneously rain 500 
or more guided missiles upon several points of an enemy’s territory. Using [the 
SSGN] would be stealthier and faster than an air raid by carrier based aircraft and 
would also avoid pilot losses.”20
Chinese literature on SSGNs suggests anxiety regarding this capability and 
what it may mean for Chinese forces. One analysis calculates that SSGNs will 
allow the United States to engage in saturation attacks: “The ground forces that 
have relied on the traditional deception against air attack, such as fake targets and 
positions, will be severely tested under future conditions in which the U.S. armed 
forces are able to employ saturation attacks by low­cost [cruise missiles].”21 An­
other analyst, however, points out that Tomahawks are expensive, estimating that 
Tactical Tomahawks cost anywhere between 5.7 and 8 million dollars a round.22 
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One Chinese lesson from the Kosovo conflict was that the United States does not 
possess an infinite inventory of Tomahawk cruise missiles; even in that relatively 
minor conflict, it adjusted its weapons stocks to cope with apparent resource 
limitations.23
Trident Submarines
Chinese writings about SSBN capabilities express concern about potential U.S. 
plans to place conventional warheads on submarine­launched ballistic missiles. 
One scholar writes that “the new Trident II D5 can achieve a CEP [circular error 
probable—generally, accuracy] of nine meters. Therefore, as far as point targets 
are concerned, there already exists the ability to achieve nuclear destruction with 
a conventional warhead.” This accuracy, he worries, might raise the risk of war 
overall: “One can see that through lowering one’s own barriers to war, one can 
more realistically deter the enemy. This undoubtedly reduces war’s actual combat 
threshold.”24 This may reflect a Chinese concern that Trident conventionalization 
could give the United States more ability to coerce China in a variety of combat 
scenarios.
The nuclear deterrence provided by American nuclear­powered ballistic­missile 
submarines (SSBNs) is well recognized in the majority of Chinese writings, as 
is the significance of the shifting of five Ohio­class SSBNs (USS Pennsylvania, 
Kentucky, Nebraska, Louisiana, and Maine) from the Atlantic to Pacific fleets from 
2002 to 2005. This transfer occurred as the four oldest Ohio­class SSBNs, which 
had all been stationed in the Pacific, were temporarily taken out of service for 
conversion to SSGNs; the two transactions effectively rebalanced the American 
SSBN force from a Pacific/Atlantic ratio of ten/eight to nine/five.25
Fast Attack Submarines
Chinese observers are intensely interested in and closely follow other modern 
U.S. nuclear submarines, including the USS Jimmy Carter, Seawolf, and Hawaii. 
Highly detailed, full­page color photos of Seawolf- and Virginia­class submarines 
appear in China’s most prominent naval journals. These photos are usually ac­
companied by articles that imply an advanced state of technology and advanced 
acoustic quieting. Thus, for example, Seawolf is described as having
an X type stern, [sic] employ[ing] a non­circulating main pump SbW [sic] pres­
surized water reactor, rel[ying] on natural circulation [of cooling water], thereby 
reducing noise; us[ing] an advanced pump jet propulsor, [thereby] reducing noise, 
us[ing] anechoic tiles on the hull. Anechoic tiles can absorb the enemy’s active 
sonar survey waves as well as both separate and reduce the submarine’s own noise 
radiation. Moreover, this ship’s own machinery power equipment also employs 
[sound isolation] technology. These measures reduce the Seawolf-class’s noise level 
	 74	 naval	war	college	review
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to 95 decibels, making it the world’s quietest submarine (ocean background noise 
is 90 decibels, Kilo 636 noise is 105 decibels).26
Additionally, Chinese authors believe Seawolf possesses “beyond­first­class per­
formance” and is regarded as the most sophisticated and lethal submarine yet to 
go to sea, despite its “tortuous development history.”27
The Chinese also respect Virginia­class submarines for their advanced tech­
nology and quietness. An author in Modern Navy states that “compared with the 
Sea Wolf–class submarine, the Virginia is slower and carries fewer weapons, but 
is just as quiet. Its acoustic signature is lower than that of the improved model 
of Russia’s Akula­class attack submarine and Russia’s fourth­generation attack 
submarine that will hereafter be in active service.”28 Another analyst, in discussing 
the Virginia class’s acoustic achievements, reports, “The Virginia-class has been 
called ‘the world’s quietest submarine,’ with a cruising sound level that is only 
1/10 that emitted by a Los Angeles class boat pierside.”29
The techniques used to build Virginia and its sister ships also evoke respect, 
with one author noting, “The use of modular construction has been a major 
breakthrough in the construction of the Virginia­class SSN. . . . This construction 
method is a revolutionary breakthrough compared to the methods used to build 
the Los Angeles–class.”30 Modular construction is widely perceived as a tremen­
dous advantage, allowing the United States to “promptly design and build new 
nuclear submarines on the basis of new circumstances and requirements.”31 Plans 
for Virginia, it is implied, having been generated by computer­aided design tools 
and relying on modular construction, could be used as the basis of a new SSBN 
design.32 Chinese authors argue that Virginia’s impressive technology allows it to 
“scout, reconnoiter, and keep watch from a concealed position using its modern 
sensors to gather intelligence; analyze it; fix radar positions, missile bases, and 
command centers; as well as watch and track warship movements.”33 The Virginia 
class is thus seen as “a completely new attitude emerging on the world military 
combat arena.”34 Some Chinese analysts believe “the U.S. will keep building Vir-
ginia class boats and the final number could exceed 30.”35
Los Angeles–class submarines receive significant attention from Chinese au­
thors. One article on this class notes, “The American Navy believes that: nuclear 
attack submarines are the most worthwhile weapons investments because they 
are the most survivable weapons platforms, have the advantage of being stealthy, 
and have become one of the premier threats at sea.”36 Another author rates their 
performance as “outstanding,” with the reservation that although they have supe­
rior weaponry, they “might not [have proved] an effective counter to new types 
of Soviet nuclear submarines.” This impending disparity, in turn, is credited with 
precipitating U.S. follow­on designs.37 Still another observer notes that Los 
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Angeles–class submarines are aging: “By the year 2020, the U.S. military intends to 
have built 30 nuclear attack submarines. However, by the year 2016, all of the Los 
Angeles–class submarines will exceed 30 years of service life”; the writer empha­
sizes the great expense of replacing them with Virginia­class vessels.38
Chinese naval observers regard American torpedo technology highly. Not­
ing an enviable six decades of torpedo experience, one Chinese author observes, 
“Since World War II and for a relatively long period, U.S. torpedo technology has 
always been among the best in the world.”39 With specific reference to the Mark 
48 heavyweight torpedo, another analyst assesses that “the [Mark 48] torpedo’s 
outstanding effectiveness in all combat circumstances has been proven and it 
can be used to attack surface ships, nuclear submarines, and also diesel electric 
submarines.”40 The same author describes the aggressive U.S. torpedo­testing 
program: “The USN has already carried out more than 6500 exercises and war­
shot firings [with the Mark 48], in addition to 20,000 simulations and 9 million 
mathematical simulations, so that this torpedo reaches a high state of reliability.” 
Perhaps in reference to the sinking of Russian Oscar­class submarine Kursk, and 
also as part of an overall effort to improve submarine safety consciousness, this 
analyst later observes that “the [Mark 48] system has been in active service since 
1982 and there have been no safety accidents.”
Not every Chinese analyst would readily agree that the Mark 48 torpedo or its 
Advanced Capability (ADCAP) variant is especially fearsome. In a 2005 article, a 
Chinese author flatly stated, “Traditional heavy­weight torpedoes practically have 
no way to cope with modern diesel submarines in shallow waters.”41 The author 
notes that “shallow waters constitute a very acoustically complex warfare envi­
ronment” and that the U.S. Navy has allocated significant resources to developing 
sonars suitable for littoral combat against diesel submarines.42 Another analyst, 
however, appreciates the U.S. Navy’s ability to upgrade the weapon: “At the mo­
ment, [the Mark 48] torpedo is still being upgraded, so that it can correspond 
to the challenges associated with shallow water environments and threat—it is 
expected to be in service with the USN until 2025.”43 
Sensors, Systems, Research, Development, and Training
American efforts at exploiting advancements in commercial off­the­shelf tech­
nology have received attention. One article observes that “the updated (COTS) 
CCS MK II [fire control] system is not only used on the Los Angeles and Ohio 
classes, but is also used on the new Seawolf and Virginia class submarines”;44 an­
other points out that “92% of the hardware and 90% of the software used in 
non­publicly available projects in fact come from popular commercially available 
technologies.”45 China’s intense interest in the U.S. Navy’s use of COTS may stem 
	 76	 naval	war	college	review
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in part from Beijing’s effort to develop a world­class commercial information­ 
technology industry and to incorporate its products into the PLA.
Chinese analysts also monitor American submarine sensor development. One 
article notes, “At present, the U.S. is the world leader in developing periscope 
technology and using it on its submarines.”46 U.S. efforts to bolster the submarine 
force’s mine warfare capabilities receive particular attention.47 Moves to develop 
and acquire the Long Term Mine Reconnaissance System (LMRS) have been not­
ed, with one researcher stating that “the U.S. is now buying 8 long­range mine 
scouting systems to be put on the Los Angeles and Virginia class nuclear attack 
submarines.”48
Chinese observers pay fairly close attention to American submarine­related re­
search and development efforts. For example, websites on Chinese naval matters 
frequently report on the awarding of Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(DARPA) and Office of Naval Research (ONR) contracts.49 Chinese journals take 
advantage of these announcements and also scour the U.S. open press for sources 
that can be exploited. For example, a rather lengthy article in the June 2002 issue 
of 现代舰船 (Modern Ships) reprinted the “Submarine of the Future” briefing 
slides (complete with a logo in the upper left­hand corner of each) generated 
by the DARPA­sponsored, Lockheed Martin–led industrial consortium “TEAM 
2020.” These slides depict futuristic hull forms, sonar configurations, propulsors, 
weapons storage ideas, interfaces for unmanned underwater vehicles, and other 
elements of advanced submarine designs and concepts.50 It seems that little, if 
any, publicly released information regarding U.S. submarine­related research and 
development escapes the attention of Chinese analysts.
In keeping with the technological dynamism of U.S. platforms and their con­
stant improvement, Chinese analysts also credit the American submarine force 
with an extremely rigorous selection and training process for commanding of­
ficers. In a coauthored article in Modern Navy, Rear Admiral Yang Yi, a PLA ex­
pert on the United States and former naval attaché in Washington, emphasizes 
that “the U.S. Navy’s selection process for the commanding officers of nuclear 
submarines is very strict.” Yang details the numerous education and training pro­
grams that successful candidates must attend, as well as the periodic qualifying 
tests they must undergo. A major emphasis of his article is the extent to which 
submarine commanders must periodically update their “specialized [technical] 
knowledge.”51
HistoriCal issues
Although China is emerging as a submarine power, its submarine force, and in­
deed its navy overall, generally lacks blue­water experience, to say nothing of a 
combat history. Of course, this paucity of experience stands in stark contrast 
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to the U.S. submarine force, and PLA Navy analysts are acutely aware of that 
disparity. In fact, Chinese naval analysts have expressed particular admiration for 
the record of American submarines in World War II, pointing out that “the U.S. 
submarine force had the fewest losses” of any major submarine force “but had 
high combat effectiveness. According to statistics, the U.S. submarine force de­
stroyed 1,314 enemy ships during the war.”52 Moreover, Chinese sources indicate 
an appreciation for the accumulated knowledge that the U.S. Navy has achieved 
through decades of intense submarine operations. Another Chinese source ob­
serves: “The U.S. is a country with 100 years of experience in building sub­
marines, and with so many years of experience the USN constantly emphasizes 
the ability of a submarine to take punishment [and survive].”53
While there are numerous Chinese writings on the U.S. Navy’s submarine 
force’s campaign against Japan, this article focuses on the Chinese perceptions 
of American submarine operations during the Cold War. Some of the observa­
tions made in this context may explain aspects of contemporary PLA Navy 
submarine doctrine. For example, an article in Modern Ships relates an anecdote 
of a “Soviet Type 627 [known in the West as “November”] nuclear attack 
submarine [that] once went all out in a race with a U.S. Navy aircraft carrier, 
revealing the Soviet attack submarine’s capabilities. [This revelation] apparently 
has had a major impact on the development of a new class of American sub­
marines.”54 This appraisal of the peacetime interaction between the two navies 
may suggest that overly aggressive tactics employed by the Soviet Navy yielded 
too much information to the U.S. Navy. In general, it is quite clear that Chinese 
sources understand that a “main mission of [U.S.] nuclear attack submarines 
[during the Cold War] was to deal with the Soviet Navy’s SSBNs.”55
With respect to the Cold War at sea, one Chinese book published in 2006 is 
worthy of particular note.56 The translation of a Russian book, Secrets of Cold 
War Undersea Espionage, it states that “U.S. nuclear and conventional submarines 
would often lurk along the routes of Soviet warships, and even within Soviet ter­
ritorial waters, conducting intelligence activities.”57 It is noted that “the SOSUS 
[Sound Surveillance] system substantially helped the U.S. to cope with the capa­
bilities of the Soviet submarine force.”58 The subject of acoustic signatures is also 
raised: “In the ocean, there are simply too many sources of noise. . . . In order to 
cope with this problem, the U.S. decided to build an acoustic signature catalogue 
(resembling a fingerprint) for Soviet submarines.”59
CHinese asW anD tHe u.s. navy submarine ForCe
When considering Chinese views of the American submarine force, it is certainly 
relevant to consider how China appraises its own antisubmarine warfare forces. 
Generally, China considers its ASW forces to be weak. One Chinese naval 
11
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analyst observes: “[Chinese] people are focused on China’s submarine force (both 
conventional and nuclear) development, but often neglect the threat we face from 
[U.S. Navy] submarines.”60 It is, moreover, suggested that “there is still a relatively 
large gap between [China’s] ASW technology level and that of the world’s ad­
vanced level.”61 In appraising the ASW capabilities of its own surface forces, an­
other naval analyst notes, “Across the world, most naval ships are now equipped 
with towed array sonars, which has increased their ASW capabilities, but most of 
our ships only have hull mounted sonars.”62 Finally, there is a concern that these 
antisubmarine assets are themselves highly vulnerable: “Submarines can carry 
out ferocious missile attacks from tens or even 100–200km ranges, causing the 
submarine hunting vessels to become the hunted targets.”63
Chinese aerial ASW is also highlighted as a particular weakness. One Chinese 
analyst judges that the Z­9 helicopter lacks adequate range and internal space 
for the ASW mission.64 A second argues that while the Z­8 has better range and 
capacity, it is too big for most surface combatants to carry and chronic engine 
troubles have limited production.65 The Russian­import Ka­28 ASW helicopter 
is reported to be capable but few in numbers.66 As for Chinese maritime patrol 
aircraft, some designs have apparently been developed, including a variant of the 
Y­7 Fearless Albatross, but the outlook is said to remain bleak.67 Thus, one evalu­
ation of Chinese aerial ASW concludes, “Our country at the present stage does 
not have an ASW maritime patrol aircraft . . . but the number of submarines in 
our peripheral seas is increasing, and their technological sophistication is also 
increasing. This contradiction is becoming more obvious every day, creating a 
grim situation.”68
In Chinese discussions of Russian ASW systems, there is a pointed recogni­
tion that the Soviets leaned heavily toward the use of tactical nuclear weapons 
(e.g., nuclear depth charges and torpedoes) in ASW operations.69 Tactical nuclear 
weapons are also mentioned in the context of mine warfare. An article in the July 
2006 issue of Modern Navy, in discussing possible PLA Navy use of sea mines, 
suggests the potential combat value of nuclear­armed versions.70 It will be impor­
tant to watch closely for any sign of Chinese efforts in this direction.
While the overall impression is that of Chinese ASW weakness, there is one 
notable exception. Significant prioritization appears to be given to the use of sea 
mines for the antisubmarine mission, as if to produce a “poor man’s ASW capabil­
ity.”71 One discussion explains, “Because of a tremendous change in the maritime 
strategic environment, since the early 1990s the PLA has made mobile ASW sea 
mines a focal point of weapons development.” The analysis continues, “[China] 
is energetically undertaking the research mission [of] using [mobile ASW sea 
mines] against U.S. nuclear submarines.”72 The same discussion also hints at a 
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possible PLA Navy ASW role: “The major mission of self­guided sea mines is to 
isolate American nuclear submarines outside the First Island Chain.”73
It is noteworthy for the future development of Chinese antisubmarine war­
fare that hydroacoustics has been called a “key point” technology for state in­
vestment.74 The conventional wisdom has long been that the Chinese submarine 
force is focused entirely on the anti–surface ship mission. This assumption may 
have become outdated, perhaps especially after the PLA Navy received the last 
of eight new Kilo­class diesel submarines (and accompanying weaponry) from 
Russia in 2006. According to Professor Li Daguang of China National Defense 
University, these new Kilos have four missions: to blockade Taiwan, threaten car­
rier battle groups, employ land­attack cruise missiles as a “strategic weapon,” and 
“form an underwater threat to the U.S. nuclear submarine force.”75 There is also 
preliminary evidence that China is moving toward deploying antisubmarine rock­
et weapons on its newest surface combatants.76 This system is no “silver bullet,” 
as the Chinese would still have severe, perhaps insurmountable, targeting and 
cueing problems, but successful acquisition and deployment of ASROCs would 
extend the engagement range of Chinese ASW weapons significantly. It is also 
worth noting that Chinese sources discuss “many openly published dissertations 
concerning underwater targeting for a homing depth charge.”77
To reverse the equation: How do Chinese naval analysts appraise American 
ASW, and in particular the submarine force’s part in it? Clearly, the PLA Navy 
understands the overall centrality of SSNs in U.S. antisubmarine warfare. Thus 
an article in Modern Navy states: “The nuclear attack submarine . . . is the most 
effective tool for ASW.”78 However, some PLA Navy observers appear rather un­
impressed by American efforts in ASW. The same official Chinese Navy journal 
observes: “The U.S. Navy actually has not had sufficient exercises in the [ASW 
arena] and also lacks experience.”79 In the same article, it is likewise noted that 
“conducting ASW in the littorals represents a special difficulty for the USN” and 
that “the combat advantage of the U.S. Navy nuclear submarine force in the lit­
toral areas is far from obvious.”80 On this note, Campaign Theory Study Guide, 
a 2002 textbook written by China National Defense University scholars that 
draws on a variety of high­quality doctrinal publications, emphasizes that “nuclear­
powered attack submarines have difficulty operating in close proximity to shore 
due to natural conditions.”81 Another Chinese naval analysis suggests that “up 
to 2005, the USN has altogether 350 ASW platforms, just 11% of the number of 
[ASW] platforms it fielded in 1945. Moreover, many of these current naval and 
air platforms are not specialized for ASW, but more often are multi­mission plat­
forms.”82 This quantitative comparison across historical periods is crude in some 
ways, but there is no denying that inherent physical principles combined with the 
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vast geographical area of the Pacific Ocean will likely keep ASW an asset­intensive 
mission, even in the age of “net­centric warfare.”
tHe u.s. navy submarine ForCe-level trajeCtory
Chinese discussions of the American submarine force focus heavily on the continu­
ing decline in its size. As one article from a People’s Republic of China (PRC) naval­
interest publication states, “The decline of U.S. submarine strength is inevitable.”83 
Indeed, that a wide variety of Chinese naval sources share this evaluation suggests 
that this “decline” now passes for conventional wisdom within the PLA Navy. The 
Chinese naval community is likely paying close attention to internal U.S. debates, 
knowing that investments made (or forgone) today in submarine fleet moderniza­
tion shape the future fleet.
Some Chinese assessments of the Seawolf program appear to point out indi­
rectly the internal political tensions that hold down American submarine build 
rates now and perhaps in the future. One volume notes: “Although the Sea Wolf–
class SSN gathers the era’s most advanced technology in a single hull, and pos­
sesses beyond­first­class performance, the appraisals of ‘Sea Wolf ’ by American 
public figures from all walks of life differ, with a roughly half­and­half split be­
tween praise and condemnation.”84
Taking the long view, Chinese naval strategists recognize that force levels have 
dropped drastically from Cold War levels. One source observes, “Since 1989, 
the U.S. Navy’s nuclear­powered attack submarine [force] has been reduced by 
half.”85 A more recent Chinese naval press article estimates that “[U.S.] nuclear 
attack submarines will decline in number by close to 40%, eventually reaching 30 
boats.”86 This calculation is roughly consistent with a projection in Modern Navy 
that anticipated a sustained build rate of one boat per year.87 Rear Admiral Yang 
Yi, writing in 2006 on the future size of the American submarine force, quoted 
one American analysis as follows: “China already exceeds [U.S. submarine pro­
duction] five times over. . . . 18 [USN] submarines against 75 or more Chinese 
navy submarines is obviously not encouraging [from the U.S. perspective].”88
a reputation For mastery?
This article demonstrates that Chinese strategists are keenly interested in the U.S. 
Navy’s submarine force. Thousands of articles have reviewed various aspects of 
American submarine capabilities, operations, and developmental trends. There is 
clear evidence that Chinese naval analysts have enormous respect for U.S. subma­
rines, submariners, and their weapons. Certainly, China aspires to be a submarine 
power and hopes to emulate certain aspects of American experience. However, 
it is equally clear in these writings that the U.S. submarine force is seen as a key 
challenge in any military confrontation between Beijing and Washington. It is 
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significant in that regard especially that Chinese analysts are increasingly drawing 
attention to, and seeking to remedy, their antisubmarine warfare deficiencies. The 
study also reveals an apparent assumption within Chinese naval analytic circles 
that American submarine force levels are on a downward trajectory.
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